Ahstrad -Given the growing demand for uccounlabilily in the public sector, there is a need to begin to inve.stigate audit pricing issues in this sector. This study makes three contributions. First, it develops and es^timates. for the llrst time, a nn»del of audit fee determinants for the charity sector. As in previous private sector company studies, size, organisational complexity and audit firm location are the major determinants. A positive association between audit fees and fees tor non-audit services is also observed. Charity sector factors of empirical significance include the nature of lhe charity (i.e.. grant-making or fund-raising), its area of activity and ihc importance of trading income. Separate nuxlels for granl-making and fund-raising charities rellect the relative complexity of the audit of fund-raising charities. Second, the lower auditor concentration in the charity sector market, compared to the private sector market, permits a more powerful test of whether large firms and/or auditor expertise are rewarded with a fee premium. In the more complex audit cnvirnnmeni of fund-raising charities, the results show that Big Six audil firms receive higher audit fees (IS.S'/f. on average) than non-Big Six firms. Also. non-Big Six audit firms with charity expertise arc rewarded with a fee premium over other non-Big Six firms. Finally, the study demonstrates that the charity audit fee rate is significantly lower than that of private seclor companies: in fact it is approximately half. A change in the reporting of charity audit fees is proposed lo reflect any element of "chariiable giving' by the audit firm.
Introduction
The tnarket for audit services is recognised to be segmented into distinct sub-markets. To date, research has focused on the private sector market (which itself comprises di.stinct sub-markets). The principal issues that have been investigated are market structure (including the related issues of market concentration, auditor selection and auditor change) and audit pricing. Early audit pricing studies were motivated by concerns that the top tier audit firms (then the Big Eight) were earning excess economic rents due to the existence of an oligopolistic market structure. Later studies, conducted in a more competitive auditing environment, were motivated by concerns regarding lowballing, and the potential resultant weakening of auditor independence and reduction in audit quality. Most recently, attention has shifted to examine the impact of auditor industry specialisation (i.e., expertise) on audit fees (for example, Peaison and Trompeter, 1994: Craswell, Francis and Taylor, 1995; CuUinan, 1998) : results to date have been contradictory.
In addition to the extensive literature on audit *The authors are, respectively, professor of accounting, senior lecturer, senior lecturer and lecturer at the University of Stirling. They wish to thank the two anonymous referees for their helpful, detailed and constructive comments on previous drafts of this paper. Correspondence should be addressed to Dr A, Goodacre. Department of Accounting, Finance and Law. University of Stirling Sliding FK'J 4LA. Tel; 01786 467291; Fax: 01786 467308: Email; Alan. Goodacre^stir.ac.uk The final version of this paper was accepted in August pricing in the private sector, there are also a few studies that investigate sub-markets within the public sector (e.g., Baber. 1983: Baber, Brooks and Ricks. 1987) . The objective of these studies is to establish the generalisability of findings regarding audit fee determinants from the private sector to other audit markets, and also to identify additional factors reflecting the unique aspeets of the accounting and auditing environment in the public sector. Moreover, the demand for accountability in this sector is incteasing and so audit pricing studies of sub-markets within the sector are of importance in their own right. To our knowledge, however, no study has investigated audit pricing in the voluntary sector.
The voluntary sector is seen to be the "major third force (in addition to the private and public sectors) in society without which much social provision would seize up" (SCVO 1997:4) . In many countries, political and fiscal constraints on the welfare state are resulting in an increased flow of public resources into the sector, with local government contracting with the sector to provide services. The charity sector is the most significant component of the voluntary sector.' Approximately 4% of the paid UK labour force is estimated to be employed in this sector, with registered charities in England and Wales having an income of £16bn in 19% (Pianca and Blackwood. 1996:1) . This represents approximately 3^% of gross domestic product (GDP) (Wise, 1995:3) . There are approximately 187.000 registered charities in England and Wales alone (Pharoah and Smerdon, 1998 ).-Currently, public confidence in this sector is low, due to a number of highly publicised scandals and frauds and poor quality reporting (Accountancv Age, 1998; The Herald. 1999) . There is clearly a need to demonstrate greater accountability if this sector is to achieve its full potential (NCVO. 1998) . Moreover, accountability must be especially rigorous in this sector due to the weakness of the 'customer' (i.e.. beneficiary). The recent creation of unofficial independent monitoring bodies, such as The Accreditation Bureau for Fundraising Organisations, seeks to restore the public's trust {Accoimiancy Age, 1998) . The independent audit is a key means of providing accountability, but the requirement for an external audit depends on the exact nature of the charity and its location. Incorporated charities whose annual gross income is above £250.000, or whose balance sheet total exceeds £l.4m, are subject to a full statutory audit under the Companies Act 1985.
Unincorporated charities in England and Wales also require an audit if annual income or expenditure exceeds £250.000 (Charities Act 1993) but in Scotland the threshold is £100.000 (Law Reform Act 1990) . Charities falling below these thresholds may nevertheless have provisions in their governing documents that require an independent audit. Generally, smaller charities may be required to undergo an independent examination of their financial statements or to appoint a reporting accountant.
Auditors of charities must comply with the Auditing Practices Board's Auditing Standards and take into account the additional considerations contained in the 1996 Practice Note 'The Audit of Charities" (AFB, 1996) . Rule.s on the appointment and remuneration of auditors are contained in the relevant legislation (e.g.. The Companies Acts, the Charities Act 1993). However, for non-incorporated charities there are no members to ratify audit appointments and there is no formal requirement for an annual general meeting as a forum for appointment, so the choice of auditor is effectively left to trustees. Audit reports are normally addressed to the trustees or directors (if incorporated), although the charity's governing document or specific legislation may identify another or other -One need only look to North American economies to see the poienlial for growth in ihis seclor. In Canada, for example, expenditure by registered charities represented \2% of GDP in 1993 (Bryden. 1996; Sharpe. 1994 ).
parties to whom the auditor should report. For example, the British Museum is audited by the National Audit Office which reports to the Houses of Parliament, under the Museums and Galleries Act 1992. since the museum is predominantly funded by the government. Additionally, there is a general statutory duty under the 1993 Act (for England and Wales) for auditors to report certain matters such as misconduct or mismanagement by trustees directly to the Charities Commission, which is the regulatory body. In Scotland, auditors have a right (not a duty) to report such matters to the Lord Advocate. Oddly, charitable companies are not subject to this reporting duty under current Companies Act provisions.
All charities in the UK should adopt the accounting requirements of The Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) Accounting by Charities, issued in 1995 by the Charities Commission. This is supplementary to the accounting requirements of the Companies Act 1985. Charities Act 1993 and Financial Reporting Standards. The SORP was issued in recognition of the need to improve the quality of charity reporting. The key feature of the SORP is the requirement for a Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA) in lieu of an Income and Expenditure Account, though the latter may still be required under legislation such as the Companies Act. The SOFA shows all incoming resources (capital and revenue), direct charitable expenditure separate from other expenditure such as fundraising and administration costs, and a reconciliation of movements in the charity's separately identified funds for the year.
Auditors in the charity sector must therefore familiarise themselves with the SORP requirements as well as the legislation and regulations particular to the constitution of their client charity, its governing documents and the additional auditing considerations outlined in the APB Practice Note. All of our sample charities fell within the audit thresholds and were subject to the SORP requirement to disclose audit fees in addition to fees "for other financial services such as taxation advice, consultancy, financial advice and accountancy' (SORP. para. 162. p.37).
Audit market structure in the charity sector differs substantially from that found in the private sector. In the UK, the private sector exhibits a high and rising level of supplier concentration. Panel B of Table 1 (extracted from Pong, 1999: 461) shows that, in 1995, the Big Six audited 75% of UK listed companies and accounted for a market share of 92% based on audit fees. The equivalent figures for the charity sector (Panel A in Table I taken from Barings (1998)) show that the Big Six audited just 25% in number of the top 2,620 charities and accounted for a market share of 26% based on audit .30 of Barings (i998) . firms on pages 8. 3-8 (1999) . 91.9
36 of Barings (1998). fees. Moreover, the composition of the top six charity auditors differs from the Big Six. Binder Hamlyn, a 'second tier' firm, audits 105 charities. ranking fifth and emerges as the market leader based on audit fees. Further, the National Audit Office also features in the top tier of charity auditors, ranking sixth based on audit fees but based on a smaller number of audits. The 'outlier* of the Big Six is Arthur Andersen, who apparently undertook just four charity audits (Barings. 1998: 8.3 ).T hese differences in market structure provide a unique setting within which to examine the hnks between market structure and pricing (an aspect of market conduct) that have concerned previous researchers.
The different audit risks and audit market structure mean that the charity sector is a valuable setting within which to develop and test audit pricing models, thereby extending our understanding of pricing issues generally. Moreover, the growing importance of this sector in economies worldwide, and the need for a high level of accountability, mean that an understanding of audit fee determinants in this sector is important in its own right. The present study has four objectives. First, to develop and estimate a model of charity audit fee determinants. Second, to assess the existence of a Big Six brand name premium in a market in which none of the Big Six firms is considered a specialist. Third, to test the pricing impact of expertise in a niche market where the Big Six firms have less dominance than is commonly encountered. Fourth, to undertake an explicit comparison of the level of charity audit fees with those prevailing in the private sector. While the latter does not contribute directly to our general understanding of audit pricing, it will provide preliminary evidence to form the basis of further research on audit risks in the charity sector.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature on audit pricing, covering first the private sector and then the limited number of studies on the public sector. Studies that specifically examine the impact of expertise, in the form of market share, are also reviewed. Methods are described in Section 3, including a discussion of audit risks in the charity sector, model specification and the procedures for the comparison of audit fee levels at the sectoral level. Section 4 deals with sample selection, followed by the presentation and discussion of results in Section 5. A final section summarises and concludes. ' However, in 1^44. Anhur Anderson and Binder Hamlyn effectively merged when the tour major UK otTiues of Binder Hamlyn were taken under the Arthur Andersen umbrella.
Prior literature
There exists a well-developed literature on the determinants of audit fees in the private sector, dating from the seminal article by Simunic (1980) . Three principal lines of research have emerged, which focus on the presence of a Big Eight fee premium, the presence of low-balling, and the impact of non-audit services (NAS) provision. The main objective of Simunic's study was to investigate the impact of the audit firm size variable, after controlling for cross-sectional differences in auditee characteristics. At this time, rising concentration ratios within the market had led to concerns that the Big Eight were behaving monopolistically, i.e., the audit industry was not competitive. In the market of the late 198{)s, however, the concern was that audit firms were 'low-balling", i.e.. quoting fees below cost to secure clients. Thus, this line of research focused on initial audit engagements. The third main line of research focused on the impact on audit fees of the provision of NAS by the incumbent auditor, amid concerns that such provision impaired auditor independence. Simunic (1980) develops a pricing tiiodel in which the audit fee is determined by differences in loss exposure, differences in the assessed losssharing ratio, differences in auditor production functions, and auditor identity. He notes that the observation of a Big Eight premium, while consistent with the extraction of monopoly rents, is also consistent with the existence of product differentiation accruing to high reputation. Moreover, the potential existence of economies of scale would offset both of these factors (Simunic, 1980: 170) .
Loss exposure is proxied using auditee size (total assets), complexity (number of consolidated subsidiaries, number of industries engaged in. and proportion of foreign assets), and risky asset types (proportion of debtors and proportion of stock). The loss-sharing ratio is proxied by the accounting rate of return, the existence of a net loss in the two prior years, and the presence of a 'subject to" qualification in the current year. Differences in auditor production functions are captured by an audit tenure variable.
Simunic finds that auditee size is the most important determinant of audit fees. Only the accounting rate of return and tenure variables were not significant in the regression equation, and the overall explanatory power was 46%. The key variable of interest, a Big Fight dummy variable, was insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis that price competition prevails could not be rejected. Moreover, the negative sign on the coefficient suggested that the Big Eight enjoy economies of scale, which are passed on as lower fees to auditees (Simunic. 1980: 187-188) .
In subsequent studies, the main control variables in Simunic"s model have consistently been found to be significant. The basic specification of the audit fee model has remained essentially unchanged over the last 20 years, although one or two new explanatory variables have been added.T he explanatory power of the model has generally been in the region of 70%. The model has been estimated using many different data sets, drawn from several countries and time periods, in an attempt to assess the generalisability of extant findings and. in some cases, to resolve conflicting findings regarding the audit fee premium variable.
Studies that focus on the existence of a Big Eight (more recently. Big Six) fee premium include Simunic (1980) , Simon (1985) , Palmrose (1986a) , Erancis and Simon (1987) , Beatty (1993) . and Gist and Michaels (1995) in the US; Taylor and Baker (1981) . Taffier and Ramalinggam (1982) , Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993), Brinn. Peel and Roberts (1994) . Pong and Whittington (1994) . and Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1996) in the UK; Erancis (1984) and Erancis and Stokes (1986) in Australia; Firth (1985) and Johnson. Walker and Westergaard (1995) in New Zealand; Chung and Lindsay (1988) and Anderson and Zeghal (1994) in Canada; Low, Tan and Koh (1990) in Singapore; Lee (1996) and Gul (1999) in Hong Kong; Simon, Teo and Trompeter (1992) in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; Simon, Ramanan and Dugar (1986) in India; and Langendijk (1997) in the Netherlands.
Results, while inconclusive, are suggestive of the existence of a fee premium in the case of small auditees, but not large auditees (e.g., Palmrose, 1986a; Erancis and Simon. 1987; Talfler and Ramalinggam. 1982; and Erancis and Stokes. 1986 ). This premium is generally attributed to the existence of differentiated audit services, consistent with the predictions of DeAngelo (1981a) .
Studies that focus on the existence of lowballing are of two types: those that focus on real markets and those that use data generated from artificial markets. Studies using real market data include Simon and Erancis (1988) . Turpen (1990) . Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) in the US; Gregory and Collier (1996) in the UK; Butterworth and "" Gist (1992 Gist ( . 1994 ) examines lhe audilee's regulatory complexity and finds proxies for Ihi,s factor to he significant and e,\pli(,-ablc ill terms of scale economies and specialisation eJ'-t'ects. Iyer and Iyer( 1996) examine lhe impact of the Big Eight mergers on tees and find none, -Craswelt and Francis (1999) conclude, following Dye's (1991) anaiylical work, thiit the public disclosure of audit fees in Australia precludes initial engagement discounting ,'iueh as observed in the U.S. However, ihis conclusion is not consistent wiih the UK evidenee of Gregory and Collier (1996) who report a significant discount in a selting where audit fees are disclosed, '' There is some evidence that this general finding is contingent upon the type of NAS supplied and confined to corporate finance and tax services rather than consultancy services (E/,zamel et al,. 1997), Houghton (1995) and Crasweli and Erancis (1999) in Australia. DeAngelo's (1981b) model predicts that low-balling will occur. Because audit cost functions are unobservable, fee cutting on initial engagements is used as a proxy for fees cut below the cost of conducting the audit. This may result in model mis-specification. A significant fee reduction in the initial engagement year is observed in both the US and the UK (Simon and Erancis. 1988: -24%; Turpen, 1990: -19%; Ettredge and Greenberg. 1990:-25Vr; Gregory and Collier. 1996; -22%) . However, this is not found in Australia.Ŝ tudies that use artificial markets include Schatzberg (1990 Schatzberg ( . 1994 and Schatzberg and Sevcik (1994) . Schatzberg (1990) flnds evidence consistent with DeAngelo's (1981b) prediction that low-balling will occur when transactions costs are positive. Schatzberg (1994) and Schatzberg and Sevcik (1994) extend this work to examine the relationship between low-balling (price) and auditor independence (quality) and find evidence thai transactions costs are not a necessary condition for low-balling to occur. An alternative rationale is the existence of cross-sectional variation in audit cost and quality and an informational advantage that accrues to an incumbent auditor-client pair regarding future variations in these audit dimensions.
The impact of NAS provision has been the focus of several studies including Simunic (1984) , Palmrose (1986b) , Parkash and Venable (1993) and Davis, Ricchiutc and Trompeter (1993) in the US; Holland (1996, 1997) in the UK; Barkess and Simnett (1994) in Austraiia; and Firth (1997) in Norway. These studies generally show a positive relation between audit and non-audit fees,^ which is interpreted by some authors as due to knowledge spillover effects and/or audit production efficiencies and a priceelastic demand for audit services. While other authors dispute this interpretation, a satisfactory alternative has yet to be proposed. Further, using production function data that allows them to control for audit effort. Davis et al. (1993) do not find a significant relation, suggesting that the link is not due to a pricing premium. Parkash and Venable (1993) distinguish between recurring and non-recurring NAS. arguing that only recurring NAS are likely to result in a reduction in perceived auditor independence. They find that auditees purchase higher levels of recurring NAS when they engage industry specialists, which suggests that the selection of an industry specialist is a quality signal that permits the auditee to purchase higher levels of recurring NAS than would otherwise be the case.
Organisational differences can result in differences with respect to factors that determine the supply and demand, and thus the fees, for audit services. A number of studies have examined the determinants of audit fees in the context of the public sector (Baber, 1983; Beck and Barefield. 1986 : Baber, Brooks, and Ricks. 1987 : Rubin. 1988 : Ward, Elder, and Kattelus. 1994 : Sanders, Allen and Korte, 1995 : Deis and Giroux. 1996 : and Bandyopadhyay and Kao. 1998 .^ These studies are all conducted in North American settings, most frequently the municipal audit tnarket. It is found that, in addition to the determinants of audit fees in the private sector, additional variables that reflect the unique aspects of the public sector environment have significant explanatory power (e.g., political factors).
Finally, a recent development in the literature is a focus on the impact of auditor expertise and specialisation. Some studies have found that auditors with a specialism in a particular sector receive an audit premium, but others have found that such auditors charge lower audit fees. In an early US study, Palmrose (1986a) found no evidence of an "industry specialism' premium. Using a large sample of Australian listed companies, Craswell. Francis and Taylor (1995) attempt to disentangle the two components of the Big Eight fee premium: the general brand name premium and the industry specialisation premium. Three levels of audit quality are posited and supported by their evidence: at the highest level specialist Big Eight firms, then non-specialist Big Eight firms, then non-Big Eight firms. Matthews, Jubb and Houghton (1997) extend this work to investigate the structure in the market for audit services in Australia based on the traditional Big Six/non-Big Six dichotomy and a specialisation definition of 20% of state industry audit fee market share, i.e., a four-sector system. Their audit pricing evidence suggests that these four sectors collapse into two levels of audit quality. The higher level includes specialist Big Six, non-specialist Big Six and specialist non-Big Six, while the lower level comprises non-specialist non-Big Six audit firms.Û sing fee data from listed Hong Kong compaWhile this paper was under review, we became aware of a working paper hy Clatworihy, Mellett and Peel (2000) thai examines audit tees in UK NHS trusts. This is n market in which auditors are appointed by the Audit Commission and private sector auditors are in the minority. Their model explains 41^c of observed fee variation. Unusually, they find a significant nejiative relationship between audit and NAS fees, supporting the 'knowledge spillover' hypothesis. No evidence is found of a Big Six auditor premium. They also report that the ratio of auditor foes to turnover is less than half that for private healthcare companies. This finding is attributed to differences in audit risk, supply-side factors such as labour cost differentials and/or demand-side factors, such as the existence of a dominant purchaser and regulator.
" Ritson. Jubb and Houghton (1997) develop a continuous measure of the extent of change in industry specialisaiion and Hnd this variable lo be significant in a mode! of auditor change. Specialisation is measured as the percentage of louil revenues earned by the auditor from the auditee's industry (Ritson et al., 1997:10) , a measure that avoids the use of a subjective cut-off rule.
nies, DeFond, Francis and Wong (2000) find evidence of Big Six premia both for general brand name and for industry specialisation. Interestingly, however, they find that a specialist non-Big Six firm in one sector discounts fees relative to other audit firms. They conclude that Big Six brand name reputation is a necessary foundation on which to extract a fee premium based on industry specialisation.
Researchers have also investigated other audit markets that are less dominated by the Big Six. Cullinan (1997 Cullinan ( , 1998 examined the effect of industry expertise on audit fees in the US multi-etnployer pension plan market, a market in which the Big Six firms have a relatively small market share. Results indicated that non-Big Six firms with industry expertise received a fee premium over nonspecialist firms, whereas Big Six firms with larger market shares did not. This suggests that non-Big Six firms may be able to benefit from market specialism in niche assurance service markets. Earlier, Ward et al. (1994) had found that an 'auditor experience' variable was positively associated with audit fees in their study of US municipalities. The study on school district audits in Texas by Deis and Giroux (1996) found that auditors with greater market share charged lower audit fees, as did Pearson and Trompeter (1994) in their study of the US insurance company audit market. Thus, overall, the evidence for an "expertise" audit fee premium is somewhat mixed.
Methods

Audit risks in the charity sector
Before describing the audit fee model adopted in the current study, it is necessary to discuss the nature and extent of audit risks in the charity sector since these differ somewhat from those encountered in the private sector.
By law, charity trustees have similar responsibilities to company directors (i.e. safeguarding assets, annual reporting, compliance with relevant legislation and other regulations, and the prevention and detection of fraud and error in their financial statements by means of internal control systems Case law suggests therefore that, provided the auditor does not actually assume a duty of care to a third party relying on audited financial statements, his duty of care is restricted to those with whom he has contracted to carry out the audit. According to the Caparo decision, in order for an individual to take legal action against an auditor, there must firstly be proximity, in the charity sector there is no body of shareholders and therefore no obvious party to sue an auditor for negligent work. Gordon, Greenlee and Nitterhousc (1999) , in their useful overview of the regulation of US charities, similarly affirm that, under US legislation, 'individual donors have no standing to bring suit against charitable organisations in court'. A review of UK case law (Sweet & Maxwell's Current Lciw Cases Database, 1986 to date) failed to reveal any cases involving auditors of charities being sued; the vast majority of the cases dealt with issues such as charitable status, property and tax law. These observations suggest that litigation loss may not be a key factor in charity audit risk, though it is possible that the courts might be prepared to extend the duty of care in the case of voluntary/public sector bodies. However, 'reputational loss' may be an important consideration in auditors" overall risk assessment.
The external audit of charities also presents risks that are peculiar to the sector. The Auditing Practices Board (APB) issued a Practice Note (Practice Note 11, October 1996) in which they identify five inherent risk factors requiring particular consideration by auditors of charity accounts. First, the extent and complexity of regulation affecting the voluntary sector is high, which increases the risk that either trustees or directors may unintentionally breach regulation. Tax rules are especially complex in this area as can be witnessed by the extent of case law arising in recent years. Second, the significance of donations and cash receipts presents problems for the auditor in terms of vouching completeness of income and controls over cash handling. Third, the uncertainty of future income, whether the source is voluntary or grantbased, creates difficulties for the auditor in assessing going concern status. Fourth, the fact that many charities rely on voluntary workers, fundraising on the charities' behalf from widespread branches and retail outlets, is a significant risk factor. These volunteers are not controlled by the reporting entity in the way that employees are, and their skills, competence and integrity cannot be readily judged. Finally, the auditor must pay attention to the charity's governing documents to ensure that it is operating according to its objects, that its trustees are complying with their designated authority, and that its financial activities are compatible with any restrictions laid down in those documents.
Charity audit fee model
The first objective in the present study is to develop and estimate a model of charity audit fee determinants. In common with previous studies, our approach is to seek to explain the cross-sectional variation of audit fees using an OLS regression model. Much of the logic of previous work on private sector companies is relevant in deriving our model but it is also necessary to consider additional potential explanatory variables to capture the unique aspects of charifies. For ease of exposition, the variables used in the basic charity audit fee model are classified into five mutually non-exclusive categories: auditee size, auditee complexity, audit production costs, non-audit services and audit difficulties and, thus, the general model specification can be summarised as: audit fee = f (auditee size, auditee complexity, audit production costs, non-audit services, audit difficulties) 
3.2.}. Auditee size
A financial audit involves the review of the accounting and internal control system and of the financial transactions of the organisation. Larger organisations will usually undertake more transactions and have larger balance sheet assets and liabilities, thereby requiring more audit work. Thus, it is expected that larger charities will generally be associated with larger audit fees. In private sector studies, auditee size has often been proxied by company total assets (e.g., Taylor and Baker, 1981; Brinnetal, 1994 :Firth, 1997 ) and occasionally by total sales (e.g., Haskins and Williams, 1988; Chan et al., 1993) . in public sector studies of local government audits, population has been used as the size proxy (e.g.. Rubin, 1988; Baber et al.. 1987) .
The measurement of size in the charity sector is not straightforward. First, most charities are by nature service-providers so the link between output and assets is not well defined. This link is further obscured once the difference between the two major types of charity is considered. Grant-making charities tend to have relatively high asset levels, but these are often investments of various types 
•aising 1 acti\ ou c
•ustee and. therefore, are reasonably straightforward to audit. By contrast, fund-raising charities have relatively few assets but there are significant control difficulties associated with funds raised. Given the problem of using assets as the size measure, we use total incoming resources (the closest charity equivalent to company sales), while also recognising the major difference between grant-making and fund-raising charities via a dummy variable {type). This dummy takes the value of 1 if the charity is fund-raising and 0 if grant-making so the higher audit cost associated with the former will be reflected in an expected positive coefficient. As this dummy variable might more usefully be considered an indication of complexity we classify it as such. To test whether the results are sensitive to our choice of size measure, we also use measures based on total assets and on total funds (i.e., the '' They report a bivariate correlalion between sales (S) and assets (A) of 0.98 but do nol report the results of any ftirthcr diagnostic tests for multicollineurity. They merely assert that "The tact that the slantlard errors [prestiniably toefficienls was intended] on S and A in Table 3 are slalistically signitlcani at an acceptable level suggests thai it (i.e.. tnulticollinearity) is nol a serious problem". Further. Gregory and Collier (1996:20) report having problems with multicollinearity when they used the Pong and Whittington model. "* A Mackinnon-While-Diividson (see Gtijarati. 1995; 265) test of functional form rejected the linear model and aceepled a log-linear model as potentially appropriate. Euriher evidence from a Durbin-Watson test and the Ramsey RESET specification test (see Gujarati. 1995: 462 ff. ) confirmed the linear model as inappropriate, but both log-linear and quadratic models were acceptable. However, the level of heteroskedasticity was much higher for the latter (as Pong and Whittington, 1994. conceded) .
" A number of standard control variables relating to audit risk are omitted from the models. Some of the omitted variables (e.g. "loss-making", return on investment) are not relevant to non-profit organisations such as charities. Parallel measures based on operating surplus/deficit would not capture similar risk aspects since charities expect to report deficits. Indeed a deficit could be seen as a measure of success in achieving tbe aims of the charity! "Liquidity' measures, such as current and quick ratios, are also omitted frotn our model specification. In prior studies, the coefficients on these two variables are typically found to be significantly positive and negative, respectively. This suggests that either the two variables are collinear (quite likely given their construction) or that they are proxying for something other ihan liquidity. For exatTiple, the current ratio includes botb stock and debtors, both of which are difficult to audit suggesting a positive relationship with audit fees. On the other hand, high liquidity should reduce the likelihood of firm failure, (hereby reducing audit risk and implying a negative relationship with audit fees. In view of the difficulty in interpreting results for these variables, we have preferred to include stock and debtor measures separately in our mixlel specification.
' -^ Many prior empirical papers have taken the square root (or log) transformation of the number of subsidiaries. Although this has not been adopted in the present paper, additional testing shows that the results are not sensitive to this. In Model I a, for example, adoption of the square root proxy leads to one very minor change in the significance of variables: tbe t-statistic for SS changes from 1.98 to 1-9(3 giving significance at the lO' yf rather than 5'^ level (in fact the p-value changes from 0.049 to 0.059).
sum of restricted and unrestricted funds).
Audit costs are likely to benefit from economies of scale since the cost of assessing the control system is relatively fixed in nature and sampling theory dictates that the cost of transaction testing need not increase linearly with the number of transactions. Thus, the use of a non-transformed size variable may not adequately reflect the fee-size relationship. Most previous studies have adopted a log transfomiation of the size variable to reflect this non-linearity. However. Pong and Whittington (1994) argue against the use of a log transfortnation of variables, such as size, without explicit consideration of the underlying relationship. They accommodate economies of scale by using a nontransformed asset variable in addition to its squared equivalent. They also recognise the difficulties associated with each of the two main size proxies by incorporating both sales and asset variables in their model. They argue that the resulting multicollinearity between assets and sales does not present a serious problem.*^ Consequently, we also assess the usefulness of incorporating both variables in our models.
To establish the most appropriate functional form of the size measure, preliminary tests of the relationship between charity audit fees and total incoming resources were undertaken.'" These confirmed that a linear model is inappropriate, but that both a log-linear model and a quadratic model are acceptable: results for both models are reported later.
Auditee complexity
It is likely that the level of audit work will increase with the level of auditee complexity. In previous private sector studies, proxies for complexity have included the number of subsidiaries, the number of industries in which the company participates, the number of different company locations and variables relating to asset composition. To the extent that relevant parallel proxies exist in the charity sector, they have been used, and u number of proxies unique to the sector have also been identified."
The parallel complexity proxies in the charity sector are the number of trading subsidiaries (.VH/W),'" the number of different significant areas of activity Uliyers). the number of trading outlets (outlets) and the number of branches (branch). The equivalent asset composition proxies, indicating the importance of the relatively 'difficult to audit' asset-classes stock and debtors, were tneasured as the proportion of total assets represented by debtors (deb) and by stock {stock).
Several unique dimensions of complexity in the charity sector may impact on the level of audit fees. First, the fundamentally different nature of fund-raising and grant-tnaking charities was as-sessed by incorporating the npe binary variable (discussed in the previous section): the cla.ssification in Barings was adopted here.
Second, it can be hypothesised that a charity's constitution might affect the work required of the auditor and, consequently, the audit fee. This could result from additional reporting requirements to government or regulators, or perhaps from differing trustee (or equivalent) needs for audit assurance. This was explored by categorising the charity as a company, a trust, or one whose constitution was set up by Act of Parliament or Royal Charter. This split was incorporated using dummy variables for the latter two categories (constT = I if the charity is a trust. consfA = I if Act of Parliament or Royal Charter), leaving company status as the base case.'^ A priori, the expected signs on these coefficients are difficult to predict.
While the diversity of activities within a charity is one potential audit fee determinant (already proxied by divers), the specific area of charitable activity might also be important. This is analogous to the argument supporting the use of industry dutnmies in private sector audit fee studies (e.g., Simunic (1984) and Barkess and Simnett (1994) both found evidence of significant industry factors). To as.sess this, classifications were extracted from Barings and dichotomous variables constructed for the major areas of activity represented in the sample charities. A charity with at least 50% of its expenditure in a particular area of activity was classified as having a major interest in that area. Five areas of activity had at least 20 sample charities with a major interest in the area, so were considered for inclusion in the model. One of these areas, "internationar. was strongly correlated with another variable (oseas) and was excluded from the model as the latter was considered more effec-' •* The coefficieni on consiT measures the incremental audit fee (log transformed) ft)r charities with a 'trusi' constitution above the audit fee for the base case of ii charity with a 'company' constitution: a similar argument applies to consiA. '"' It is possible that the linancial statements of housing group chariiies may differ significantly from other charities (e.g. the amount ol' land stock tnay be expected to be much higher) and that this may affect some of the key ratios. The sensitivity of the results to this was tested in two ways. First, inclusion of an extra dummy variable far charities in this subsector was incorporated in ihe basic model 1 la). The coefficient on this dummy w;is insignificant (t-stal -0,56) and there was a minor change in the significance of jiLst one of the control variables (divers, marginally ceased to be significant: p value = 0,115), Second, the regression was re-estimated excluding all housing group charities: there were no changes in variable significance. We are grateful to one of the referees for drawing this point to our attention.
'^ A charity auditor suggested that the variety of different sources of income also affects the level of audit fees. To Ihe extent that charities in a particular sector have similar sources of income, this aspect is proxied by ihe "area of activity' dummy vatiables. tive in capturing charities with significant overseas involvement. Thus, four dummy variables representing major areas of activity were included in the model; these were "culture, sport and recreation (CSR)\ "education, training atid scientific research (ETR)\ "health and medicine (//A/)" and "social services and relief (SS)' .^'^ Charities within other areas of activity acted as the base case.
Other aspects of charities" operations that may itnpact on audit fees include involvement overseas, significant trading activities, and the importance of fund-raising activities.''^ Overseas involvement (oseas) was measured dichotomously. taking a value of 1 if there was any evidence of significant overseas activity within the financial statements. Trading activities are broadly incorporated in the model through the variables "number of trading subsidiaries' (suh^-) and "number of trading outlets' [outlets). As these two variables are rather crude indicators of trading activities, an additional variable indicating the relative importance of trading in generating income was also investigated. This was measured as the proportion of total incoming resources relating to gross trading activities (trad%). Similarly, the binary variable (type) based on Barings categorisation of charities as fund-raising or grant-making only crudely captures the importance of fund-raising activities within a charity. So, to capture more accurately the potential increased audit costs associated with the difficulties in control of fund-raising activities, an additional continuous warmble fundr% was incorporated; this measures the proportion of total incoming resources relating to fund-raising. All three additional variables (oseci.s, trud% and fundr%) are expected to have positive coefficients.
Finally, it is possible that the number of trustees (or equivalent) might affect audit risk. On one hand, it could be argued that a larger number of trustees might lead to more rigorous governance and a commensurate reduction in audit risk. On the other hand, a large trustee group might lead to a reduction in each individual's perceived responsibility and perhaps fewer meetings, thereby resulting in weaker, less robust, organisational governance. The number of trustees was captured in a variable trust, whose expected sign is, a priori, indeterminate.
Audit production costs
In common with private sector audits, two aspects of the audit process are expected to have an effect on audit fees. The location of the audit staff undertaking the audit will affect the costs of employing audit staff, with higher costs associated with the London area. This is proxied by the office location of the audit firm undertaking the audit as indicated in the audit report. A dichotomous measure [audioc) is used taking the value I if the location was London and 0 if elsewhere, and a positive coefficient is expected.""
The majority of UK private sector companies have either December or March year-ends, causing considerable seasonality of audit work for audit firms. It is hypothesised that audits performed around this busy period will be more costly because of the increased demand for auditors' services. This potential 'busy season" factor is captured by a dichotomous year-end variable (_v^) that has a value of 1 if the year-end is in December. January. March or April and 0 otherwise.
Non-audit services
Many private sector studies in the US (e.g., Simunic, 1984; Simon, 1985; Davis et al.; 1993) . in Australia (e.g.. Barkess and Simnett. 1994) , in Norway (Firth, 1997} and in the UK (Ezzamel et al., 1996) have observed a significant positive association between audit fees and payments to auditors for non-audit services. Several explanations for this positive relationship have been proposed, including knowledge spillovers between audit and non-audit services, but a consensus view has not emerged. The association in the charity sector is investigated by inclusion of a continuous variable. the fees payable to auditors for non-audit services (nasfee), in the audit fee model.
Audit difficulties
A qualified audit report, or a long lag between year end and audit report completion, often reflects difficulties in the auditee organisation (e.g., fraud or going-concern problems), potentially increasing audit risk. It is expected that this would lead to an increased audit fee either because additional audit work is required, or to reflect an element of insurance premium to compensate the auditor for the additional risk. Positive coefficients "• The location of ihe charily head office, taken from Barings, was investigated as an alternative proxy since a similar variable had been used in a previous study (Brinn et al.. 1994) . This was strongly correlated with audloc so was excluded from the model.
'"' As a sensitivity check, Ihe basic model (Model la) was also re-estimated excluding 18 charities with large audit delays, taken as longer than a 95*^ one-sided confidence interval (240 days). There were no changes in variable significance.
'" This somewhat lax attitude to audit reporting demonstrated by over \{)7f of the sample charities provides another illustration of relatively poor control procedures. The basic model (Model la) was re-estimated including a dummy variable for those charities with an unsigned audit report. The coefficient on this dummy was insignificant (t-stat -0.12) and there were no changes in the significance of" other variables.
'^ Mean value imputation is a strategy for dealing with missing values withoui loss of observations (Little and Rubin. 1989) . As a sensitivity check, the basic model (Model la) was re-estimated excluding all 22 charities with an undated audit report. There were three minor changes in the significance of control variables: divers and slock ceased to be significant, and the significance of trad'Tc reduced to 5%. on proxies for these two variables have been found in previous studies of private sector firms (e.g., for audit delay: Chan et al., 1993; Ezzamel et al., 1996) . However, in charity audits, there is usually less pressure to complete the audit within a short period after the accounting year-end. Thus, for charities, a greater audit 'delay" might also arise because the audit firm had been able to schedule the audit to coincide with 'slack" periods thereby benefiting from reduced marginal staff costs. This would suggest a negative relationship between audit fee and delay. The impact on the level of audit fees of a qualified audit report, here taken as any non-standard features in the audit report, is assessed using a dummy variable (opinion). The potential Impact of audit delay Is explored by including a continuous audit delay variable (delay), measured as the number of days between the yearend and the date of the audit report.''' Interestingly, the audit report was undated (and. with one exception, also unsigned) for 22 of the sample charities;'*^ the mean audit delay of the other charities was imputed for these charities.''*
Experimental variables concerning auditor premia 3.3.1. Big Six brand name premium
Once a basic model of the determinants of charity audit fees has been determined, the presence of auditor premiums can be assessed. Four specific hypotheses are investigated. Hypothesis one investigates the presence of a large firm audit premium in the charity sector. The audit market structure within the sector is especially useful for exploring this issue since Big Six auditors do not dominate the market to the extent that is true for the private sector. In particular, none of the Big Six can be described as having expertise in the sector, based on the usual definition of expertise indicated by 10% market share (e.g., Palmrose. 1986a; Craswell et al., 1995) . Thus, any observed premium can be attributed to brand name rather than any specific sector expertise.
The hypothesis can be stated in alternative form as:
Hj: The brand name of large audit firms (the Big Six) is rewarded by a fee premium above non-Big Six firms in the charity sector.
To test for the existence of a large firm audit premium, a binary variable (BIG6) to identify those charities that were audited by one of the Big Six auditors is incorporated in the regression (Model I variants). If evidence of a premium is found, a fmer level of detail can be investigated to see whether there is any diversity in reward amongst the Big Six. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H^: Individual Big Six firms are rewarded by a brand name fee premium above non-Big Six firms in the charily sector. This is tested by incorporating dummy variables for each of the five Big Six firms (KPMG, CL DT, EY, PW) that are active in the charity sector (Models 4 to 6).
Specialist premium
While Big Six auditors do not dominate the charity sector market, they still command relatively large market shares (e.g. KPMG audits 6.4% of the Barings 'top 3000"). Ideally, to assess the relative importance of brand name and industry specialisation, a joint analysis would be applied. The approach usually adopted to carry out this joint analysis is to incorporate a 'specialist" variable in addition to the Big Six dummy variable, with an interactive term Big Six*"specialist' to see if Big Six specialists earn a premium over non-Big Six specialists. Unfortunately, there is likely to be significant collinearity between 'specialist" and Big Six variables. This can lead to increased standard errors for the coefficient estimates, tending to reduce statistical significance, and also the coefficients can be more sensitive to sample data, to the extent that coefficient signs can change on introduction of the collinear variable(s) (Gujarati, 1995:325-335 ).
In the current study there was indeed significant collinearity between the Big Six and 'specialist' " For example, in the 'All Charities' model (Model la) ihe coefficieni on BIG6 is ().0%3 (t-slat ^ 1.26) when thi.s variable is included wiihoul the spt'cialisi variable. Including the specialisr variable instead oi' BIG6 gave a coefficient estimate of 0.0014 (t-stal= 1.80, significant al the 10% level). When bolh variables were incorporated together, without an interactive term, the coefficient for BIG6 changed sign to -0.0871 (t-stat = -0.71) and for speviutis! became insignificant, even though it increased in size to 0.0020 (t-stal = 1.62). Inclusion of an interactive term as well gave coefficients of -0.1442 (t-stat = -0.53) for BIG6. of 0.0018 (t-stat = 1.17) for specialisl and of O.(X)O6 (t-stat = 0.23) for the interactive lerm B/G6*spenalisl. For Fund-raising charities (Model 3), the coefficient on BIG6 included on its own is 0.1701 (t-slat -2.00, significant at the 5% level). Including the specialisl variable instead of B!G6 gave a coefficient estimate of 0,0019 (t-stat-2,36, significant at the 59c level). When both variables were incorporated together, without an interactive term, the coefficient for B/G6 changed sign to -0.0200 (t-stat = -0.13) and for specialisl became insignificant, even though it increased in size lo 0.0021 (t-stat = 1.35), Inclusion of an interactive term as well gave coefficients of 0.1716 (t-,slat = 0.60) for S/G6. of 0,0031 (t-sta! = 1.76, significant ai the 10% level) for specialisl and of -0,0023 (t-stat = -0,84) for the interactive term BlG6*specialisi. Collinearily between BIG6 and specialisl variables (and the interactive term) was evident in both seis of models: relatively high condition numbers associated wiih bigh variance proportions were observed (Belsley et al,, 1980 , Chapter 3), For example, in the 'All Charities' models, a condition number of 12,8 was associated with variance proportions of 0.83 and 0,91 for BIC6 and xpecialisr. respectively. With the interactive term included, the condition number of 26.52 was associated with variance proportions of 0.70 (B/G6). 0,34 {specialisl) and 0.86 {BIG6*specialist). respectively. variables. Introduction of the 'specialist' variable changed the sign of the Big Six coefficient to negative and reduced the significance of both variables.-" This means that sensible interpretation of the coefficients on these variables was impossible. In view of this, an alternative approach was adopted, in which separate regressions were estimated for Big Six and non-Big Six audit firms: this method has been used in previous studies of audit specialist premia {e.g., Craswell et al., 1995: 310-311) . In the separate Big Six regression model (details not reported here), there was no evidence of a fee premium for expertise in Big Six firms. This is not too surprising, given that none of the Big Six firms has a particular comparative expertise/specialism over the other Big Six firms. Specialism in non-Big Six firms is discussed further in the next section.
Non-Big Six specialist premium
The reduced role of Big Six auditors in the charity sector allows pricing by non-Big Six audittirs to be investigated, and, in particular, whether there is any evidence of reward for expertise or specialism in the sector. Certainly, some non-Big Six audit firms (e.g. Binder Hamlyn, Horwath Clark Whitehill) market themselves on the basis of specific expertise in the charity sector (see adverts on pages 1. 4, 8.7, 8.19 and others, in Barings (1998) ). but whether this is rewarded in audit pricing is unclear. Cullinan (1998: 49-50 ) discusses various alternative perspectives on audit pricing and the potential impact of market share conditioned on audit expertise. If there are no perceived differences in audit expertise, the impact of higher market share will depend on the approach to pricing adopted by firms. Cost-based pricing would yield lower audit fees as a result of economies of scale reducing perclient costs. If the audit market is characterised by a high degree of concentration, the few firms with a dominant market share could have monopolistic or oligopolistic pricing power, leading to higher audit fees under market-based pricing. If there are perceived (and actual) differences in sector expertise, this will tend to increase overall audit firm costs and the effect on per-client costs will depend on the number of clients in the sector. The impact on audit fees in a cost-based pricing environment is indeterminate. In a market-based pricing environment, greater perceived (and actual) expertise results in higher value audits, for which clients would be willing to pay more since this may reduee agency costs. Thus, higher market share is a signal of greater expertise, which should result in higher audit fees. As market concentration is much lower in the charity sector than in the private sector company audit market, there is less likelihood of monopolistic/oligopolistic pricing by a few market leaders. Consequently, observation of a fee premium is stronger evidence that clients are willing to pay higher audit fees to firms with perceived expertise in the sector.
Thus, the third hypothesis focuses on non-Big Six firms (where brand name reputation is much lower) and assesses the impact of expertise on audit pricing in the charity sector:
H^: Non-Big Six audit firms with expertise are rewarded by a fee premium above other nonBig Six firms in the charity sector.
Expertise is proxied by market share, measured as the number of charities within the top 2.620 that are audited by the firm.-' A variable {specialist) representing the audit firm's mar]<.et share is incorporated in a regression based on charities audited by non-Big Six audit firms (Model 7). If evidence of a premium for expertise is found, a finer level of detail can be investigated to see whether there is any diversity in reward amongst the non-Big Six market ]eaders in the charity sector. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
H^: Individual non-Big Six audit firms with expertise are rewarded by a fee premium above other non-Big Six firms in the charity sector.
Market leadership was based on the ranking in Barings according to the total number of charities audited, and the total audit fees charged (details in Table 1 , Panel A). Five non-Big Six firms rank in the top nine on at least (me of these two measures and binary variables are incorporated in the regression for these firms (Model 8). Table 2 (Panel B) provides definitions of the experimental variables, their names, expected coefficient signs and the sources of the data.
Procedures for cotnparison between charity and company audit fees
The general regression model described above seeks to explain the factors within the charity sector that contribute to the level of audit fees charged. A second important issue is to consider the impact, if any. that the fundamental charitable nature itself might have on audit fees. Anecdotal evidence, prior expectations and preliminary views at the data gathering stage of the current study all suggest that charity audit fees are lower than those paid by private sector non-charitable companies. There are at least three reasons why this might be the case. First, the risks involved in auditing a charity are certainly different to. and -' An alternative market share variable, based on total audii fees earned in Ihe charity sector (also taken from Baring.s, 1998). was incorporated with similar (unreported) results.
--An illustration of tbis was noied during data collection. Tbe charity 'Lloyds TSB Foundation for England and Wales' reported that 'Ihe auditors waived their fee for 1996". might well be less than, those of a non-charitable company audit (see Section 3.1 above). Lower risks should lead to lower costs for the audit firm and commensurately lower audit fees are expected if cost-based pricing is followed. Second, it seems likely that charity audits might be seen by the auditing profession as a way of supporting the charitable sector, of 'giving back" to society. Thus, a reduced level of audit fees would represent a form of altruism; in effect, a charitable donation is being made by the audit firm to the charity.--Third, there is the possibility that a lower 'market rate' for charity audits might encourage audit firms to use ]ess experienced staff and reduce audit time in trying to minimise losses incurred. The loH'er audit quality implied by this is of great concern in view of the importance of accountability in maintaining confidence in the charity sector, and of the key role that the independent audit plays in this.
To assess these alternatives, it is necessary to have some 'hard* evidence on the relative size of audit fees in the charity sector. To our knowledge, this issue has not been systematically investigated. Thus our final hypothesis is:
Hji Charities pay lower audit fees than similarsized private sector companies.
To allow for different organisational sizes, the basic measure adopted for comparison is audit fee scaled by organisation size. i.e.. audit fee per pound of revenue, with revenue measured as total incoming resources (charities) and total sales (companies); two alternative scale tneasures. total assets and total funds, are also used to check sensitivity. The usefulness of this ratio measure depends upon the assumption that marginal audit costs are constant across the whole range of company and charity sizes. Its limitation is that it does not recognise the expected economies of scale in the audit process. If the size distributions of companies and charities are similar, scale economies will not cause a major problem. However, as we find that their size distributions differ significantly, it is necessary to control further for size to effect a valid audit fee comparison. Initially, a simple size control was investigated by selecting only the subset of companies that fell within the size range (based on revenue) of our charity sample. However, even within this truncated range the distributions of companies and charities are significantly different. There is a much larger concentration of small charities, which would tend to increase the observed mean 'audit fee per pound of revenue" measure for charities. This leads to a bias against the hypothesis that charity audit fees will be lower. One way to address this problem would be to match each charity within the sample with a single company of similar size. However, this has the limitation that the matched company may have idiosyncratic audit risks. An alternative approach, preferred here, is effectively to match each charity with an average similar-sized company (based on total revenue). This is achieved by using a bootstrapping method to control for the scale economies in the audit process. This "manufactures' a closer size-distribution match between the sample of companies and charities within the similar size range. From the existing company sample, a stratified random sample was taken to mirror the distributional properties of the charity sample. Effectively, each charity was matched with a randomly chosen company from the group of companies of similar size and the mean audit fee for the charity and company samples was computed. This sampling process was repeated 1,000 times to reduce the sampling bias that would be introduced if just one such sample were chosen. This enables a distribution of audit fee sample means to be derived, and both the mean and standard error of the distribution to be estimated (Mooney and Duval, 1993 ).
-' Almost identical results (not reported here) were oblained for a sample ba,sed on selecting every alternate charity in the top 5(X) (n-176). In tbis model one of the nine significant variables in Model la ceased to be significant, namely SS with a very marginally insignificant p-vaiue of 0.101, Two of the other eight control variables increased slightly in signitlcance {(tivers to 5'7f. and stock lo I'ii ). The coefficient on the experimental variable BIG6 increased to 0.1184 but remained insignificant.
-** Of the charity sample, 84% had year-ends in 1997 and a further 14% had year-ends in the following three months (to 31/03/98). so 98% had year-ends in tbe 15-month period 31/12/96 to 31/3/98 inclusive. The Barings publication deadline means that some of its data, panicularly quantitative financial dala collected from financial statements, is not from sources time-coincident wiib those used for the current study. For our charity sample. 58% of the financial statements used were coincident with those used in Barings; the rcsi were more recent than ihose used in Barings by one year (37%). two years (4%) or three years (1%). The majority of data items (about 75%) used in tbe currenl study were extracted directly from tbe accounts provided to us by tbe charities. With one exception (auditor market share), the few data items extracted from Barings (e.g.. areas of charitable activity, grant-making/fund-raising categorisation and auditor market share) are of a categorical nature. All of these items are likely fo be relatively siable over lime, so the exaci matching in terms of yearend is not critical. Furthermore, charities provide additional data lo Barings (Barings. I998;6,III) so any non-financial data included therein is likely to be based on more reccni informalion than Ibe available financial statements. While Ibe non-coincidence in sources for some data items may introduce a source of error into tbe estimated models, we do not believe that ibese errors could be significant.
'-'' Tbis excludes finiincial companies and investment tmsls. Also, the fact that a proportion of sample charity year-ends fall in the tlrst three m(inths of tbe next calendar year (see footnote 30) may introduce a small bias in the audit fee comparison. However, inflationary audit fee increases mean tbai this is likely to be a bias af^aiitsi {]nd'ing that charities pay lower audit fees than companies.
Sample selection
Data from the UK was used, as legislation in this country requires the disclosure of key variables, in particular, fees for audit and non-audit services paid to the auditor. The sample was selected from the top 500 charities identified in the 1998 edition of Baring Asset Management Top 3000 Charities (Barings, 1998 ). This covers a wide variety of different types of charity such as the British Council, Wellcome Trust, Oxfam, the Tate Gallery, training organisations (e.g.. Construction Industry Training Board), and some housing associations (e.g., Notting Hill Housing Group). Entries are published in respect of the top 2,0(X) charities, but as a charity can qualify for inclusion on any of three criteria (income, expenditure or funds) approximately 3,000 are published in each edition; in the 1998 edition there are 2,620 charities included. Our objective was to achieve a sample that was representative of the population of major UK charities. Given the economic importance of larger charities, all of the top lCK) charities ranked by income were included in our sample.-' In recognition of the greater homogeneity expected in charities ranked between 101 and 500, every alternate charity was selected to give, overall, a stratified sample of 300 charities from the top 500. Based on charity income reported in Barings (1998) , the top 500 charities accounted for approximately 76% of the total income of £13.2bn of the top "3.000' charities. This suggests thai our sample should capture audit fee determinants for a large and important part of the charity sector. However, it does not cover the large number of relatively small charities in the sector.
Most of the data items required for the study are not included in Barings (1998) , so a considerable amount of data had to be collected manually from the charities' annual reports and accounts (see Table 2 for details). In June 1998, a letter was sent to each of the charities selected, requesting a copy of their latest annual report and accounts, with foilow-up letters sent in July 1998. All replies received by September 1998 were included in the study.-"* For the comparison of audit fees paid by companies and charities, company data for 1997 yearends were sourced from the UKQI list of industrial and commercial companies on Datastream.-^ The particular data items extracted were audit fees (Datastream item: 118), total sales (104), total assets (392) and shareholders' capital plus reserves (307). Companies whose revenue fell outside the observed charity size range (based on total incoming resources) were eliminated. Thus, 236 large companies with sales above £440m and 30 small companies with sales below £300,000 were eliminated to leave 1.084 companies. Table 3 provides a descriptive summary of the 210 charities in the final sample. From this table it can be seen that 83 charities (28%) failed to provide accounts, a level of non-response which is broadly similar to the 19% obtained by Hyndman (1990) . All charities are required by law"*^ to make a copy of the accounts available to anyone requesting them, though they may charge a reasonable sum to cover copying and postage costs. Thus, a significant proportion of charities failed to comply with the law. This is a disturbing indictment of the basic system of governance in the charitable sector, especially given that all of the •'' Barings express some concern over their classitlcation. 'In charily parlance, the expression '"grant maker" is epitomised by a foundation exclusively engaged in making grants, mainly to other charities, out of income earned on its investments. There are many charities which t"it Ihis description precisely. However, there are a considerahle number of otliers making grants in the normal course of their activities which do not In the circumstances, there are no clearly defined and generally accepted criteria by which to judge whether certain charities should or should not be described as grant makers. Wherever possible, charities are categorised in accordance with how they perceive themselves' (Barings. 1998: 6 .II). Thus, the dichotomous classification must be viewed with caution.
Descriptive statistics
sample charities are relatively large.
Three tests for response bias were performed on the full complement of 300 charities. First, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test was used to compare responding and non-responding charities on the basis of size (measured as total income, as reported in Barings, 1998) . The hypothesis that the two groups have been drawn from the same population could not be rejected (even at the 10% significance level). Second, the proportion of grant-making and fund-raising charities in both groups was compared and found to be identical. Third, the date of the most recent accounts available to Barings for its 1998 statistical compilation (Barings, 1998) was examined. Fight (9%) of the non-respondent charities had out-of-date accounts (dated prior to 1 January 1996. i.e.. more than 30 months prior to our investigation). Taken together. these results suggest that response bias is unlikely to be a serious threat to the validity of the results, though charities with 'old accounts' (and their special circumstances) are perhaps not adequately represented. Unfortunately, data availability is a constraint in many empirical studies that use publicly available sources.
Of the 210 usable responses. Table 3 shows that 142 (68%) were classified by Barings as fund-raising and 68 (32%) as grant-making charities.-^ It also demonstrates that Big Six audit firms were responsible for 42% of the audits in our sample. This percentage is higher than the overall Big Six market share of 25% reported in Table 1 . and reflects the greater preponderance of Big Six firms en- and 10% levels respectively (two-tail). gaged in the audit of larger charities, which form the basis of our sample. Table 4 provides summary statistics for each of the variables, including non-transformed size variables. Audit fees ranged from £600 to £263,000 with a mean of £25.649. Charity size, based on total incoming resources Uotir), ranged from a low of just £313,000-*^ to a high of £433.9m. and averaged £27.2m. As in previous studies on private sector companies, the correlation of 0.60 between audit fees and size is quite strong, suggesting that size is a major determinant of charity audit fees. Further, the positively skewed and leptokurtic nature of both audit fees and size encourage the use of transformed variables to improve their distributional properties. The alternative measure of size based on total assets {as.set) covers a very wide range up to an extremely large £8.584m. and is less strongly correlated with audit fees (correlation coefficient = 0.35); similar observations relate to the total funds variable itotf). The wide range and relatively low correlation for these two size measures reflects the important difference in the nature and level of assets between fund-raising and grantmaking charities and is the major reason lor choosing total incoming resources as the most appropriate size proxy.
For the binary variables, the 'mean' value represents the proportion of charities that possess the particular characteristic. For example, the mean value of 0.676 for type shows that 67.6% of the charities were in the fund-raising classification, leaving 32.4% as grant-making. The constitution variables indicate that 23.3% are trusts [amstT). 21.4% were set up by Act of Parliament or Royal Charter [constA) and, therefore, the remaining 55.3% are charitable companies. The 'health and medicine" variable (//A/) shows that almost 25% of the sample charities were significantly involved in this area of activity and that this represents the most common area. On average, gross trading (trad%) accounts for approximately 26%' of incoming resources, but this relatively large proportion needs to be interpreted with care. First, the mean is heavily distorted by one or two major out--* The total income of the smallest charily in our "top 500' sampling frame according to Barings was £4.7m. Our deflnitioii »>r lotai incoming resources is slightly different and componeni deiails were e\iracted directly from ihe financial statements rather than Barings. These differences mean ihat a small number of charilies (approximately 12) would not be classified within the top 500 based on our measure. However, these charities have been retained within our sample.
-'' The one major outlier of .'il.^ days related lo a charity whose charitable status was under investigation by the Inland Revenue; one further charity had a delay of 471 days. These are the only two sample charities with delays beyond Ihe 10-month time period by which annual reports must be filed with the Charity Commission and/or with Companies House (S45. The Charities (Accounts and Reports! Regulations 1995 (SI IW5 No. 2724} and S.244( I) of the Companies Act).
hers (the maximum trad% value of 21.53 implies that gross trading represented 2153% of total incoming resources in one particular charity), and so the median of 0% may be more representative. This more elosely reflects the fact that only 94 of the 210 charities (45%) undertook trading activities. Second, further analysis of the basic data reveals that the net contribution frotn trading (i.e., after deducting trading expenses) accounts for just 5.4% of total incoming resources, on average.
Further points to note from the summary statistics are;
• audloc shows that 55.2% of the audit firms were London-based.
• ye indicates that a large proportion (80.5%) of charity year-ends are in the audit 'busy-season' around December and March, implying that charities have probably not chosen their yearends in order to fit in with auditor slack periods.
• nasfee has a significant positive correlation with audit fees and a mean value of £7,187 representing 28% of audit fees. Further analysis showed that 44% of the charities reported non-zero fees for non-audit services with just 7% reporting nasfee higher than audit fees. This contrasts with the UK company results of Ezzamel et al. (1996) who found that non-audit services represent a much higher proportion of audit fees (87%), that 93% of their sample of companies had non-zero nasfee, with 44% reporting higher nasfee than audit fees. Non-audit services are apparently much less important in the charity sector.
• delay has a mean of 140 days implying a period of about 4i/2 months between year-end and audit report signing.-'^ This compares with mean delays of between 53 and 96 days reported for private sector companies in various international studies (see Carslaw and Kaplan. 1991: 22 , and references therein).
• the specialist variable is significantly correlated with audit fee. suggesting that sector expertise might be rewarded with a fee premium. Of the individual audit firm variables. Binder Hamlyn (BH) shows a significant positive correlation with audit fee size, suggesting the existence of a premium to one of the market leaders in the sector. Deloitte Touche {DT) carried out the most audits (10.5%).
Charity audit fee model
As expected, the bivariate correlations suggest that the major determinant of audit fees is the size of the charity (with a correlation of 0.60). Other potentially important factors (indicated by significant coiTelations at the 5%. two-tailed, level) include the number of trading subsidiaries isuhs: 0.26), the number of trading outlets (outlets: 0.15). the constitution of the charity when set up by Act of Parliament or Royal Charter (constA: 0.27), principal area of activity in social services and relief {SS: 0.21). significant involvement overseas (oseas: 0.21), the number of trustees (tmsi: 0.20). the location of the audit firm {audloc: 0.25) and the fee paid to the auditor for non-audit services {nasfee: 0.37). However, as virtually all of these are also significantly correlated with size ilntotir). the outcome of the multivariate analysis is not ea.sy to predict. One further observation from the full correlation matrix (not reported) is that, apart from high correlations between alternative size proxies, none of the other correlations between independent variables is particularly high (the highest is 0.37). This suggests that multicollinearity may not normally be a serious problem in the regression model.
Basic model
The OLS multivariate regression results for the basic model and the full sample of charities (n = 210) are reported in Table 5 (Model la).^" This model uses log transformed total incoming resources (Inl(Hir) as the size proxy.
The results for Model la confirm size (lutotir) as the major audit fee determinant, with a highly significant t-ratio of 9.01. The positive coefficient of 0.4739 implies that, ceteris parihus. audit fees increase approximately with the square root of total incoming resources, consistent with many previous private sector studies (see summary in Chung and Lindsay. 1988: Table 11 ). Of the seven other variables that were significantly correlated with audfee (see Table 4 ). only three {subs, audloc and nasfee) are confirmed as significant determinants in the multivariate model (at the 1% level). Two further variables are significant at the 1% level {type and trad%), two at the 5% level (stock and SS) and one at the 10% level (divers).
The results suggest that a number of general organisational characteristics, in addition to characteristics unique to the charity sector, are associated with differences in eharity audit fee levels. In common with private sector studies, the number of trading subsidiaries {subs) and the proportion of total assets represented by year-end stock {stock) -"^' Notwiihstanding ihe uni-directional allernalive hypotheses for approximalely half of the variables, all significance levels iti Tables 5 and 6 are reported using the more conservative two-tail tests. All procedures were carried out tising the SHAZAM v8.() econometrics program.
' This arjiument was confirmed by one of the charity auditors who provided comments on the draft paper: 'SocUd serrices/relief charities are often invoheil wiih rheir local aitlhorilies in one way or another, and this tends lo bring in Audit Commission rec/uirenieni.s that add to the cost of their statutory aiidil!' Another audilor suggested that social services charities tend to employ a relatively large number of staff: this increases audit risk, audit work and audit fees.
are positively associated with audit fees. These are consistent with, respectively, the additional audit work to meet statutory requirements and the uncertainties in valuing and confirming the valuation of stock. The significant negative coefficient on the diversity measure {divers) is contrary to expectation (but see later result for fund-raising subsample). However, the coefficient estimate may be somewhat unreliable as the divers variable is found to be significantly collinear with size measures.
The dummy variable type seeks to capture the fundamentally different nature of fund-raising and grant-making charities, with the positive coefficient implying that the greater complexity and control difficulties of the former group are reflected in higher audit fees. The form of a charity's constitution (company, trust etc.) docs not seem to impact on audit fees. Generally, the principal area of activity of a charity does not affect audit fees except for those charities within the "social services and relief sector (dummy variable SS), which have higher audit fees. As suggested earlier, this might reflect additional reporting or audit requirements imposed by the fund-providers as a condition of funding.*' The relative importance of trading activities in generating income itrad%) is a significant audit fee determinant, in line with expectations, but the relative importance of tundraising activities is not.
The significantly positive coefficient on audloc suggests that, as expected, the higher audit production costs incurred by London-based auditors are passed on to charities in higher audit fees. However, there is no evidence of additional fees related to audit firm busy periods {ye) or short audit delays {delay). These observations are consistent with audit firms seeking to minimise increased production costs by scheduling charity audits in slack periods. A non-standard audit report (opinion) does not appear to have a significant impact on audit fees.
As in previous private sector studies, there is a significant positive relationship between audit fees and fees paid to auditors for non-audit services (nasfee). Thus, in the charity sector also, there is no evidence that auditors use audit fees as a form of 'loss-leader* nor that cost savings from the joint provision of audit and consultancy services are passed on to the charity in the form of lower audit fees (or consultancy fees).
Overall, the adjusted R-of 62% implies that a good proportion of the cross-sectional variation in audit fees is explained by the model. An appropriate comparison can be made with prior studies on smaller private sector companies, since all but a small number of charities would be classified as small in the UK private sector. Thus, our R-of 62% is in line with previous studies on smaller companies (e.g.. 55% by Brinn et al.. 1994 Table 5 Basic moi 2 .2 >
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for the stnall-firm sub-sample in Chan et al., 1993) but is lower than reported in large company models (e.g., 87% by Chan et al., 1993) . This explanatory power compares favourably with that obtained in other studies that seek to develop audit fee models in niche tnarkets (for example, Cullinan (1997) obtains an R-of 0.39 for the US pension plan market).
Sensitivity of basic model to alternative size proxies and specifications
Given the difficulties involved in selecting an appropriate size proxy (see Section 3.2.1 above), the OLS regression results for two alternative size proxies and two alternative size specifications are reported in Table 5 (last four columns. Models lb through le). Model tb uses log-transformed total assets ilnasset). Model ic uses total funds {Intotf) and Model Id uses both incoming resources and assets together. The final column (Model le) reports a quadratic specification based on total incoming resources.
Six key explanatory variables (the size proxy, subs, stock, type, audloc and nasfee) are significant across all models. Several variables {divers, outlets, deb. CSR. SS, oseas and trad%) are significant in some of the models but not others. The remaining 10 variables do not appear to be significantly related to charity audit fees in any of the models. Thus, there appears to be substantial consistency across the tiiodels. The inclusion of two size proxies (Model Id) adds little, since results almost identical to those of the simpler Model 1 a are obtained. Also, interpretation of the relative importance of the two size aspects from this model is problematic due to the significant eollinearity between the two size measures. The positive coefficient on totir and tbe negative coefficient on totir in the quadratic specification for size (Model le) are consistent with the expected economies of scale in the audit process. However, this specification has little itnpact on the significance of the other explanatory variables. Overall, these results suggest that the major findings are robust to alternative size proxies and specifications. In view of this, later results will be presented for just one model (Model la) based on the log-linear model with Iniotir as the size proxy. This model has good explanatory power and has better diagnostic characteristics than the others, especially in terms of normality of residuals, thereby leading to more robust t-statistics.
'-Grant-making charities include the likes of Save the Children Fund, hlelp the A^eil. and Caitccr Rcseanh Campaign. Notwithstanding Iheir classification as grant-making, these organisaiions also undertake significant fund-raising activities, often via trading subsidiaries.
Big Six premium
Based on Model la. the BIG6 coefficient is positive but not significant, suggesting that, in aggregate, there is no evidence of a general Big Six audit fee premium in the charity sector (Hypothesis 1 is rejected). However, the coefficient B}G6 is consistently positive, and three of the alternative models in Table 5 do show relatively weak levels of significance, suggesting that this result may be somewhat sensitive to the size proxy or model specification. Overall, there appears to be some (weak) evidence of a Big Six brand premium in the charity sector (Hypothesis 1).
Comparison between fund-raising and grant-making charities
The observation of a significant coefficient on the variable type indicates that fund-raising charities pay higher audit fees, on average, than grantmaking charities. However, the potential impact on audit fees of their different operating characteristics merits further investigation. Table 6 (panel A) reports the results of re-estimating Model la separately for grant-making (Model 2) and fundraising charities (Mode! 3).
The major contrast between tbe two is the number of significant explanatory variables. Grantmaking charities (Model 2) have just three significant variables compared with 11 for fundraising charities (Model 3). with only size (Intotir) significant at the 1% level, the number of trading subsidiaries (subs) at the 5% level-*-and CSR (major activities in Culture, Sport and Recreation) marginally significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with the view of grant-making charities as a relatively homogeneous group, in which size and statutory obligations are the major determinants of audit fees.
By contrast, the factors that determine the audit fees of fund-raising charities (Model 3) are much more diverse, consistent with greater heterogeneity in the group. This, and the larger number of charities classified as fund-raising, contributes to the similarity between the 'fund-raising' and "all charities' results. However, there are three differences in the control variables for the 'fund-raising' group. The sign on the diversity measure {divers) chatiges to positive and is now significant at the 1% level, conforming with priors that audit fees will be greater in charities with more diverse operations. The number of branches {branch) coefficient becomes significant (1% level), in the direction expected. Fund-raising charities set up as trusts (constT) also seem to pay higher audit fees.
Results for the Big Six experimental variable are quite different between the two. For grant-makers. Model 2 shows that B!G6 continues to be non-significant, but for fund-raisers BIG6 is significant at the 5% level. This result is confirmed using the Other size proxies: all five models show the BIG6 coefficient as non-significant for grant-makers, and significant at the 5% (or 1%) level for fundraisers. Thus, there appears to be reliable evidence of a Big Six brand pretnium in the fund-raising sub-sector of the charity market. The size of the BtG6 coefficient (0.1701) in the log-linear specification (Model 3). is equivalent to a premium of 18.5% above non-Big Six auditors, on average (Simon and Francis. 1988 : 263, provides details of tbe calculation).
The observation of a brand name premium in only the fund-raising sub sector is not too surprising. Fund-raising charities have greater need of public confidence, in order to continue to raise funds, and therefore stand to benefit most by employing a high-profile auditor as a symbol o'i high accountability. It is possible that this need increases the relative bargaining position of Big Six auditors, enabling them to charge a premium. In contrast, it may be difficult to justify charging a pretnium to grant-making charities where the need for a symbol of high accountability is less, and where the audit process is relatively straightforward. An offsetting factor is that the significant 'negative premium" charged by Ernst & Young is partially obscuring the overall Big Six results in the grant-making charities sub-sector.'-* Formal tests confirmed that the two sub-sample models (i.e., 2 and 3) are significantly different. The Chow test is significant at the 1% level and, using the dummy variable approach (Gujarati. 1995: 512) . the coefficients on three variables are significantly different: audloc at the 1% level (two-tail), and bUotir and divers at the 10% level. These tests suggest that audit fee determinants differ between grant-tnakers and fund-raisers, implying that the pooled estimates should be treated with some caution.
•" To assess ihe importance of this impact. Ihe Big Six brand premium regression lor grant-makers (Model 2) was re-eslimaled with the exclusion of the (three) eharities audited by Ernst & Young. The BIG6 coefficient increased in size from 0,0704 to 0.2054 but remained statistically insitinificant (t-stat = 1.43).
-' -* Formal tests again confirmed thai ihe two sub-sample models (i.e.. 5 and 6) are significantly different. The Chow tesl is significant al the 1% level and. using the dummy variable approach (Gujarati. 1995:512) , the coefficients on three control variables are significantly different al the 5' 7( level (Iwotail): aiuiloc. Iniotir and divers. The experimental dummy variable EY is also significantly different at the 5'Xt level.
' "^ The result for individuai Big Six firm premia are generally eonsistent across all size proxies and specifications, but with some changes in significance levels.
"' The mean (median) audit fee for fund-raising charities is £27.730 (£18.fHH)) compared wlih 01.303 (£16,(H)0) for grant-making charities. The mean total incoming resources are £26.55ni and £28.56m respectively-Excluding outliers, the ralio of audit fee to total incoming resources tor fund-raising charities is 0.15O9(, and is slaiistically higher (al the 5'^ level, two-tail) than the 0.11 X9r for grant-makers.
Individual Big Six firm brand premia
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of testing for individual Big Six firm premia based on the Intotir size proxy. In the 'all charities' regression (Model 4) four of the five Big Six firms involved in the charity seetor have positive coefficients, and one significantly positive {KPMG) (thus hypothesis 2 is partially accepted). The other firm, Ernst & Young (£10. has a significant negative coefficient. However, this overall picture again obscures some differences between grant-making and fund-raising charities.^"* For grant-makers (Model 5), KPMG is significantly positive and Ernst & Young significantly negative, mirroring the overall results. For fund-raisers. KPMG is significantly positive (now at the 5% level) but Ernst & Young is now positive, but not significant.^T hus, there is convincing evidence that KPMG enjoy higher audit fees, especially in the fund raising sub-sector; they charge a premium of about 40%, on average, above the audit fees charged by non-Big Six auditors. On the other hand, not all of the Big Six seetn to benefit from their brand name. In particular, Ernst & Young audits seem to be priced below the non-Big Six level in the grantmaking sub-sector. There are several possible explanations for this. It may be that Ernst & Young adopt a cost-based pricing strategy (i.e.. they choose to price below what the market might bear, given their Big Six status). Alternatively, if there is market segmentation between Big Six and nonBig Six firms, the relative weakness (reduced specialism/expertise) of Ernst & Young in the Big Six segment of the charity market may be reflected in lower audit fees.
As a whole, these results confirm that fund-raising charities have more complex operations than grant-making charities, and that these complexities contribute to the higher audit fee observed.^F urther, these complexities enable some audit firms with a Big Six brand name to benefit from the greater perceived assurance that the brand name provides.
Expertise in non-Big Six audit firms
The results of testing whether a premium is earned by 'specialist' non-Big Six audit firms for expertise in the charity sector are presented in Panel C of Table 6 . First, Hypothesis 3 was investigated by incorporating a 'continuous' variable based on market share as a proxy for specialism/ expertise. Model la (size proxy = Intotir) was reestimated for charities audited by non-Big Six audit firms with the variable (specialist) based on the number of charity auditees in the top 2.620 (Barings. 1998) . There was no evidence of a premium for expertise in the 'all charities" or "grantmakers' regressions (details not reported). This is perhaps not too surprising in light of the evidence Comparison between Model 7 and Model 3 shows that the explanatory power of the model improves slightly (adjusted R-= 12.1%). and that most of the control variables are similar for non-Big Six audited charities, though there are some differences. In particular, deb becomes significant, but stock ceases to be so, charities operating in the "education, training and research" area (ETR) seem to have significantly lower audit fees, and charities with a non-standard audit report {opinion) also have lower audit fees. This last observation is contrary to expectation and does not appear to result from any collinearity. This is difficult to rationalise, but one conjecture is that the audit firm recognises the difficulties that the charity is facing and reduces the audit fee to avoid exacerbating the problems. The variable of prime interest in Model 7 is specialist and this is significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting that non-Big Six specialists do earn a premium for their expertise over non-Big Six non-specialist firms [Hypothesis 3 is confirmed).
Mode! 8 investigates whether individual nonBig Six specialist firms earn a premium for their expertise. Dummy variables were introduced for the top 5 non-Big Six audit firms as outlined in Section 3.3. Three firm dummies were significant, one at the 5% level (Binder Hamlyn (BH)). and two at the 10% level (Grant Thornton (GT). and BDO Stoy Hayward (BOO)). Thus, there is some evidence that individual non-Big Six market leaders in the charity sector obtain a premium over other non-Big Six firms (Hypothesis 4 is accepted). While this evidence is consistent with a premium for expertise in the charity sector, it could also be explained in terms of a second-tier brand name premium.^^ Our method is unable to distinguish between these competing explanations.
Regression diagnostics
To assess the potential impact of outliers on the regression results, intiuential observations were " Clatworthy et al. (2000) investigated the presence of a second-tier premium in Ihc audit tees of NHS Trust bul found no evidence to siipporl ihis.
'^ This L-hariiy had an exceplionally high triuF/< variahic thai arose from the scaling on a low level of total incoming resources. Ils influence on the trad% coefficient is significant as indicated by a high DFBETA.
"' Unfortunately, the existence of influential and outlier ohservations is rarely reported in audit fee studies (exceptions are Turpen( 1990: 67) and Gist and Michaels (1995: 257-8t) . explored using both DFFITS and DFBETAS measures (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch. 1980, ch. 2) . For example, in the basic model (la), one observation was identified as bighly influential,^*^ and a further four or 16 as possibly influential, depending on the criteria adopted. The regression model wus re-estimated excluding each of these intluential observations individually and together as a group of five or 17. Essentially, there were few changes in the results. The adjusted R-values improved and virtually all of the significant variables remained so. When the groups of possibly influential observations were excluded, just irad% ceased to be significant and one additional variable {consiT) became positively significant at the 5% level. Overall, the tests suggest that the results are not driven by outlier observations.^'* Testing for multicollinearity was carried out using a principal components approacb, by observing whether the condition indices were below the suggested cut-off of 15 and/or not associated with high variance proportions on two (or more) variables (Belsley et al.. 1980, Chapter 3) . Generally, collinearity was not a problem except when both B1G6 and specialism variables were incorporated in a model, as discussed earlier in Section 3.3.2. The assumption that the residuals are normally distributed was tested using the Jarque-Bera statistic (Tables 5 and 6 , penultimate row) and accepted in al! four models for "all charities' and "grunt-makers*. For "fund-raisers", the normality of residuals is reduced and is rejected at various levels of significance in the different models. However, the violation of the normality assumption does not appear to be sufficient to invalidate the use of the t-distribution in significance testing. The assumption of homoskedasticity was formally assessed using the Breusch-PaganGodfrey test (Tables 5 and 6 , final row) and rejected at the 5% level for Models la through le, and Models 7 and 8. Thus, the significance levels for the regression coefficients in these models are reported using White's (1980) heteroskedastie-consistent covariance matrix estimation.
Charity and private sector audit fees compared
One of the objectives of this paper is to assess the impact that the fundamental charitable nature itself might have on audit fees by comparing the size of audit fees paid by charities with those paid by private sector companies. Panel A of Table 7 provides some summary measures for the sample of charities and the company population within the charity revenue range. The mean audit fee for charities of £25.700 is less than one-third of the mean company audit fee of £87.400; the median measures show a similar picture. However, this overstates the difference between charity and company audit fee levels, due to the limitations of this For example, the median revenue measure for charities {totir) is only approximately one-third of the equivalent company measure (.sales), and lor assets about one-half. To get a clearer picture, the level of audit fees relative to organisation size was computed and these measures are summarised in Panel B of Table 7 . To reduce the significant distortion that some observations were introducing. the measures were computed after excluding all extreme outliers.""' For comparison, measures including outliers are also reported in a footnote to Table 7 .
Charities pay. on average, approximately 0.14% of total incoming resources by way of audit fee in contrast with the 0.23% paid by private sector companies; i.e., the charity audit fee rate is just over half that of private sector companies. This difference is, not surprisingly, statistically signifV cant at the 1% level. The tests based on other size measures yield essentially similar results. However, the validity of these initial comparisons remains open to criticism on two grounds.
First, the sample of charities includes both fundraising and grant-making organisations. As discussed earlier, grant-making charities are more likely to have a larger proportion of investmenttype assets, to operate in a more closely controlled manner with less transactions and have less diversity of operations. Their audit costs are expected ""' Extreme outliers are defined us more Ihan 10 X interquartile range above the upper quiirlile: negative measures for audfee/shlunds are also excluded. Inclusion of iill outliers gives meaningless results for ratios based on total or shareholders funds because the major outlier is so extreme (e.g. for charities. 3.875 times as large as the overall median!). For the other ratios, outlier inclusion increased the observed differences between cbanlies and companies in all cases.
generally to be lower than for fund-raising charities as was confirmed in the charity audit fee regression models. As the company sample does not include any 'similar' financial companies, such as investment trusts, the company audit fee ratio is likely to be biased upwards. This would tend to increase the observed difference in company over charity audit fees. To overcome this problem, a second set of .statistics was calculated based only on fund-raising charities and the results are also presented in Panel B. The charity audit fee ratios increase, as expected, but not markedly (e.g.. audfee / totir increases to 0.15% from 0.14%). The difference between mean measures for charities and companies remains statistically significant at the 1% level, except for the asset-based ratio which is significant at the 10% level. Thus, the charity audit fee rate appears to be in the region of 65% of the rate of comparable private sector companies.
Second, the size distribution of charities and companies within the charity revenue range differs substantially, as illustrated in Table 8 , which shows the number and proportion of organisations within nine size intervals. For charities. 174 (84.0%) of the total sample have total incoming resources of less than £40m and fall within the two smallest size intervals, with 60.8% in the smallest category. By contrast, only 49.3% of companies fall within the same two smallest size intervals, with just 31.6% in the smallest category. Thus, there is a relatively larger proportion of small charities than companies and vice versa. This distorts the cotnparison of audit fees due to the expected and observed economies of scale which occur in the audit process. These scale economies are demonstrated clearly in Table 8 , which shows that the mean level of audit fee/revenue increases systematically as organisation size decreases.
To minimise this 'size-distribution' bias, a more precisely size-matched sample of companies was achieved by adopting the 'bootstrapping" method described earlier. The method, based on total revenue, was applied to lest for lower audit fees in the sample of all charities (but with outliers excluded), and in the sub-sample of fund-raising charities.
The results are presented in Panel C of Table 7 . For the company sample, now properly sizematched with the all-charities sample, the mean of the distribution of audit fee/sales was 0.298% compared with 0.139% for charities. The t-statistic for the difference in means is -il.35 indicating a very high level of statistical significance, and confirming acceptance of hypothesis 5. The results based only on fund-raising charities are similar, with the mean for the size-matched companies of 0.291% again being much higher than the mean value (0.150%) for the charity sample. Thus, in a properly size-and type-matched comparison, the charity audit fee rate is approximately half that of private sector companies.
Summary and conclusions
The study develops and estimates, for the first time, a model of charity audit fee determinants. As in previous private sector company studies, size is the major determinant. Several dimensions of organisational complexity (including the number of subsidiaries, and stock level) and audit firm location (i.e., London-based) are also important. Specific charity sector factors that contribute include the importance of trading as a source of charity income, the major area of activity in which the charity operates, and the fundamental nature of the charity (i.e., whether predominantly grant-making or fund-raising). Separate models are developed for the latter two categories of charity and the results reflect the relative complexity ot' the audit of fund-raising charities. By contrast, grant-making charities are relatively straightforward and their audit fees typically have just two determinants (size and the number of subsidiaries). Auditors* provision of non-audit services is much less important in the charity sector than the UK company sector. However, the somewhat anomalous positive association between audit fees and NAS, which has been observed persistently for noncharitable companies, is also found in the charity sector, particulariy for fund-raising charities.
The lower auditor concentration in the charity sector provides a valuable opportunity to investigate whether large firms and/or auditor expertise are rewarded with a fee premium. The results show that Big Six audit firms, on average, receive higher audit fees for audits of fund-raising (but not grant-making) charities.,Given that none of the Big Six can be described as having particular expertise in the sector, this premium can be attributed to brand name rather than any specific sector expertise. The observation of a brand name premium in only the fund-raising sub-sector is perhaps not surprising. Fund-raising charities have greater need of public confidence, in order to continue to raise funds, and therefore stand to benet"it most by employing a high-profile auditor as a symbol of high accountability. This may increase the relative bargaining position of Big Six auditors, enabling them to charge a premium. In contrast, it may be difficult to justify charging a premium to grantmaking charities where the need for a symbol of high accountability is less, and where the audit process is relatively straightforward.
The size of the premium is approximately 18.5% on average, somewhat smaller than the premium implied in studies of UK private-sector companies. For quoted companies, Chan et al. (1993) found a premium of 36.7%, Ezzamel et al. (1996) , 23.5%, and for independent unquoted firms Brinn et al. (1994) found a 28.0% premium. By contrast, neither Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1996) , in their study of medium-sized UK companies, nor Clatworthy et al. (2000) in their study of UK National Health Service Trusts found any evidence of a large audit firm premium.
Of the five Big Six auditors active in the charity sector, only KPMG (with the largest number of charities audited) consistently earns fee premiums. By contrast, the audit fees charged by Ernst & Young seem to lower than those charged by nonBig Six auditors in grant-making charities.
There is evidence that market-leading non-Big Six audit firms in the sector are rewarded with a statistically significant fee premium in the more complex audit environment of fund-raising charities, but the average size of this premium above other non-Big Six auditors is not economically significant (only about 0.5%). However, individual non-Big Six auditors with expertise (especially Binder Hamlyn) do appear to earn economically significant fee premia above other non-Big Six firms. Such observations are consistent with a premium either related to charity sector-specific expertise or related to a second-tier brand name premium, but our research approach is unable to distinguish between these competing explanations.
The study also provides preliminary evidence on the overall level of fees paid by charities relative to those prevailing in the private sector. In a properly size-and type-matched comparison, the charity audit fee rate is significantly lower than that of private sector companies: in fact it is approximately half. The magnitude of this differential raises important issues concerning the reasons for the lower charity audit fees. While these issues warrant further investigation, it is likely to be difficult to explain unambiguously the lower charity fees. However, the lower audit fees are certainly consistent with auditors perceiving audit risks to be lower in the charity sector, and/or with auditor altruism in not charging the 'market rate". Unfortunately, they are also consistent with lower quality audits, in which audit firms recognise a lower 'market rate' in the charity sector and respond by cutting costs to minimise losses incurred.
Currently, the argument that the quality of charity audits might be lower than company audits is difficult to refute. This is potentially damaging to both charities and their auditors. A change in the reporting of charity audit fees could improve the situation where there is an element of 'charitable giving' in the audit fee charged. The gift element could be recognised as such in the income section of the Statement of Financial Activities and the •fuir audit fee charged against the income. Alternatively, disclosure of the information could be included in the notes to the accounts. Either method would provide users of charity financial statements with a clearer indication of the extent of audit work performed and of the level of audit firm altruism, both of which are hidden under current reporting practices. This suggestion is consistent with the move towards the valuation and recognition of gifts and services provided 'in kind' advocated by the revised SORP 2^' and might usefully be included in a future version of the SORP.
Feedback on the results from a small set of charity auditors was generally encouragingly supportive of the main findings.'*-However, a particular limitation is that the sample of charities was taken from the top 500 charities, and it would be dangerous to extrapolate the results to the rest of the top 3,000 or to the large number of much smaller registered charities.
•" Piiragraphs 107-108 of SORP 2 give details for recognition of 'gifts in kind" and paragraphs 109-110 concern "inlangible income". The difficulty associated wiih valuing voluntary help is recognised in paragraph 110 which recommends thill such help should not be accounted for in the Sialfinenl of Financial A<iiviiie\. but should be deall with in the notes to the accounts or in the Trustees' Annual Report. However, valuation of the cost of work carried out hy audit firms in conducting the annual audit should not present the same difficulty. ' . The charging of a subsidised audit fee would seem to tit within such a recognition rule.
"*-The 1 inal stage of ihe research process was to obtain some feedback directly from charity auditors. An executive summary and an earlier drafi of this paper were sent out lo a small sample of leading charity auditors for iheir comments. Seven copies were sent oui and. alihough only three replies were received, these provided several useful insights and additions to the paper.
